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I. EC Vertical Restraints Block Exemption Regulation and Guidelines on
Vertical Restraints
On June 1, 2010, new European Union ("EU") competition rules on supply and distri-
bution agreements entered into force. The rules apply to all business sectors except motor
vehicles. This section provides a summary of the new EU competition rules and also
briefly compares the application of U.S. antitrust law to restrictions in vertical
agreements.
The new EU legal framework consists of the new European Commission ("EC") Verti-
cal Restraints Block Exemption Regulation ("VBER")' and related Guidelines on Vertical
Restraints ("EC Guidelines"). 2 The new rules use the term "vertical" to refer to supply
and distribution agreements entered into between companies operating at different levels
of the production chain, such as agreements between manufacturers and wholesalers or
retailers.3 The EC is concerned only with those types of vertical "restraints" or restric-
tions on competition that arise when there is some degree of market power, either at the
level of the supplier, the buyer, or both.4
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1. European Commission Regulation 330/10, On the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union to Categories of Vertical Agreements and Concerted Practices, 2010
O.J. (L 102) (EU) [hereinafter VBER].
2. European Commission Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, 2010 OJ. (C130) [hereinafter EC
Guidelines].
3. See EC Memorandum, Memo 10/138, Antitrust: Commission adopts revised competition rules for ver-
tical agreements: frequently asked questions I (Apr. 20, 2010), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressRe-
leasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/ 10/138&format=PDF&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.
4. See, e.g., EC Guidelines, 9] 6, 23.
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The VBER "block exempts," or provides a safe harbor for, supply and distribution
agreements concluded between companies that have limited market power, defined as a
market share of both the supplier and buyer not exceeding thirty percent of their relevant
market.5 To qualify for the safe harbor, agreements must contain no "hardcore
restrictions."6
Agreements qualifying for this "block exemption" receive a positive presumption that
the agreements will not have anticompetitive effects and are exempted from the prohibi-
tion against anticompetitive agreements set out in Article 101(1) of the EU Treaty.7 For
vertical agreements concluded by companies whose market share exceeds thirty percent,
there is no exemption and no presumption that the agreement is either legal or illegal.8 It
will be necessary to assess the agreement's positive and negative effects on the market
based on the EC Guidelines accompanying the VBER. 9
The VBER lists a series of specific arrangements, labeled as "hardcore restrictions," that
are considered so serious that their inclusion in an agreement will preclude that agreement
from benefiting from the safe harbor exemption, regardless of the parties' market shares.' 0
Hardcore restrictions include restraints on the buyer's ability to determine its sale price,
commonly referred to as resale price maintenance ("RPM"), or certain types of resale
restrictions, which may create barriers to the EU's internal market." Manufacturers can,
however, encourage an exclusive distributor to invest in an exclusively allocated territory
or customer group by protecting them from active sales by other distributors.12 The man-
ufacturer cannot restrict its distributor from responding to customers' direct demands,
known as "passive sales."' 3 The VBER also allows manufacturers to choose their distribu-
tors on the basis of specified criteria and to prohibit sales to unauthorized distributors,
known as a "selective distribution" system.14 Selected distributors must retain the ability
to sell to other authorized distributors and to any end consumer.' 5 Any other restriction
of their freedom regarding where and to whom they may sell would be a hardcore
restriction.
The new EC Guidelines contain a detailed discussion of Internet sales. Some of the
most controversial issues that arose under the previous rules concerned the extent to
which suppliers could limit the Internet sales activities of their distributors. The new
guidelines attempt to strike a balance between allowing consumers to take advantage of
cross-border purchasing and protecting against those distributors that "free-ride" on the
promotional and marketing investments of other distributors. 16 The following restric-
tions on passive selling included in the EC Guidelines are considered hardcore restrictions
on Internet sales: an absolute prohibition on Internet sales, requiring distributors to re-
5. See VBER, arts. 3-4.
6. Id. art. 4. See infra notes 10-15 and accompanying text.
7. See, e.g., VBER, art. 2(1).
8. See, e.g., EC Guidelines, 96.
9. Id. 97.
10. See VBER, art. 4.
11. Id.
12. See VBER, art. 4(b)(i).
13. See EC Guidelines, 51.
14. Id. 11 174-88.
15. See VBER, art. 4(c) & (d); EC Guidelines, 1 174.
16. See EC Guidelines, 52-54.
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strict access to their website for customers outside their territory or refuse payments by
credit cards not issued in their country, limiting the proportion of a distributor's sales over
the Internet, and requiring Internet product prices to be higher than offline sales.17
Suppliers have the ability to protect an exclusive distribution system by restricting active
sales and regulating online sales to maintain the quality of the distribution network and to
prevent free-riding. Consequently, suppliers can prevent distributors from selling only on
the Internet and refusing to supply pure online players, impose quality and service condi-
tions which must be equivalent to conditions applicable to offline sales, require a certain
absolute amount of products be sold through retail store and fixed-fee to support distribu-
tor's online or offline efforts, and condition the use of third party platforms only in accor-
dance with agreed standards.' 8
The presumption remains in the EC Guidelines that the inclusion of hardcore restric-
tions will be anticompetitive, violating Article 101(1) and therefore unlikely to benefit
from the exemption provided in Article 101(3).19 But the new EC Guidelines allow
greater room for argument that the Article 101(3) exemption may apply even to hardcore
restrictions if it can be shown that they generate efficiencies.
The clearest example of this exemption is the new text setting out the three circum-
stances in which fixed or minimum RPM may be exempted, a possibility not even contem-
plated under the prior rules. 20 The EC Guidelines state that minimum RPM may be
necessary to induce distributors to invest efforts in introducing a new product or brand; to
coordinate a short term (six to eight weeks), low price campaign; or to encourage distribu-
tors to provide additional pre-sales services. 21 It will be for the parties to the agreement to
prove that the criteria for the exemption are met.22 The EC and many national competi-
tion authorities ("NCAs") and courts are expected to remain cautious in attributing eco-
nomic benefits to resale price maintenance, but those NCAs and courts that favor a more
generous approach may be emboldened by the new EC Guidelines.
The EC Guidelines also contain new provisions on how the EC will assess agreements
for "up front access payments" ("UAPs")23 and "category management" agreements. 24
The EC Guidelines define UAPs as fixed fees that suppliers pay to distributors for services
such as the provision of shelf space for the supplier's product or access to the distributor's
promotional campaign and, in principle, are exempted by the VBER.25 Even where UAPs
are not block exempted, the EC recognizes that such arrangements can contribute to
more efficient allocation of shelf space for new products and can prevent suppliers from
free-riding on distributors' promotional efforts.26 On the other hand, the EC recognizes
that their widespread use by retailers can increase barriers to entry for small entrants and
can potentially result in an anticompetitive exclusion from the market or collusion be-
17. Id. $ 52.
18. Id. It 53-54.
19. Id. 1 47.
20. Id. 11 223-29.
21. Id. 1 225.
22. Id.
23. Id. 9 203-08.
24. Id. 11 209-13.
25. Id. 203.
26. Id. 11 207-08.
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tween distributors.27 Category management agreements allow a distributor to appoint a
leading supplier in charge of its marketing of a particular product category and may be
exempted by the VBER.28 When the exemption does not apply, the possible benefits-in
terms of access to marketing expertise and economies of scale-will need to be balanced
against the risks of anticompetitive exclusion of other suppliers and possible collusion be-
tween suppliers and distributors. 29
U.S. antitrust law contains no direct analogue to the VBER, but it does make a distinc-
tion between vertical and horizontal agreements that can affect the standard applicable in
determining the lawfulness of the arrangement. Historically, U.S. antitrust law has distin-
guished between vertical non-price agreements (such as customer or territorial restric-
tions) and vertical price agreements (such as the imposition of a minimum or maximum
resale price). 30 Vertical non-price agreements are evaluated under a rule of reason, which
requires a balancing of pro-competitive benefits versus anticompetitive effects. The U.S.
Supreme Court has held that non-price restraints have "real potential to stimulate inter-
brand competition." 31 Robust interbrand competition, according to the Court, provides a
significant check on any increase in intrabrand market power resulting from the imple-
mentation of vertical non-price restraints. 32 In declining to apply a per se rule of illegality
and adopting instead a rule of reason analysis, the Court held that the adverse competitive
effect of vertical non-price restraints on intrabrand competition generally is outweighed
by the "market-freeing" benefits that such restraints can provide to interbrand competi-
tion.33 To establish a violation in such cases, plaintiffs will generally be required to
demonstrate that the defendant possesses market power in a properly defined relevant
market and that the challenged practice harms competition in that market (e.g., resulting
in higher prices or reduced output).
Vertical price-related restrictions were also generally evaluated under a rule of reason
analysis with one exemption: minimum resale price maintenance. But in a 2007 case,
Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.,34 the U.S. Supreme Court overruled its
ninety-six year-old precedent requiring application of the per se rule to vertical minimum
resale price maintenance agreements, and held instead that such agreements should be
assessed under the rule of reason. Under Leegin, a court will focus on the net pro-compet-
itive or anti-competitive effect of resale price maintenance. The Court held that resale
price maintenance can be pro-competitive because it may stimulate interbrand competi-
tion by (1) reducing intrabrand price competition and thereby increasing non-price com-
petition among the manufacturer's retailers; (2) encouraging retailers to increase tangible
or intangible services or promotional efforts to support a brand; (3) discouraging discount
retailers from free-riding on retailers that furnish services; and (4) facilitating market entry
for new firms or brands.3s The Court nevertheless held that resale price maintenance can
27. Id. 1$ 204-06.
28. Id. 1 209.
29. Id. IT 209-13.
30. See, e.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
31. Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 724 (1988) (citing Continental TV., Inc., 433
U.S. at 52 n.19).
32. See, e.g., Business Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S at 725.
33. Id. at 726.
34. Leegin Creative Leather Prod., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc, 551 U.S. 877 (2007).
35. Id. at 890-91.
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be anticompetitive if it facilitates a manufacturer or retailer cartel or is used by a powerful
manufacturer to "give retailers an incentive not to sell the products of smaller rivals or
new entrants" or a powerful retailer to "forestall innovation in distribution that decreases
costs."3 6 The Court provided some guidance for analyzing resale maintenance agree-
ments under the rule of reason, stating that "certain factors are relevant to the inquiry,"
including the number of manufacturers engaged in that practice in the market, whether
the restraint is at the request of the retailers or manufacturer, and whether the manufac-
turer or retailers driving the practice possess market power.37
Whether applying EU competition law or U.S. antitrust law, the analysis of restrictions
in vertical agreements requires a knowledgeable and independent assessment that takes
into account the facts and circumstances of the restrictions' likely competitive effect. As
the EC Guidelines acknowledge, "[flor most vertical restraints competition concerns only
arise if there is insufficient competition at one or more levels of trade, that is, there is
some degree of market power at the level of the supplier or the buyer or at both levels."38
As a practical matter, the analysis of distribution agreements under EU competition law
and U.S. antitrust law may result in similar outcomes. There remain some important
differences, in particular, when a distribution agreement may threaten the integration of
the single market-one of the fundamental bases of the EU.
HI. Standard Terms in Contracts for the Sale of Goods
A. INCOTERMs@ 2010
Incoterms are rules published by the International Chamber of Commerce ("ICC"),
that are commonly used in international trade and that provide standard definitions of the
rights and obligations of the parties in contracts for the sale of goods. Although courts
and other governmental authorities may choose to rely on Incoterms definitions in con-
struing contract terms even where the parties have not expressly referred to Incoterms
definitions in their contract, 39 it is good practice for the parties to expressly incorporate
Incoterms definitions by reference when desired. The ICC published the first version of
Incoterms in 1936, with subsequent revisions published in 1953, 1967, 1976, 1980, 1990,
2000, and 2010.
From their inception, Incoterms were intended to be a guide for international trade and
practice. To keep pace with the development of international trade and technology, the
ICC has updated the Incoterm rules on a regular basis. Practitioners in global trade use
Incoterms for guidance in their transactions, in order to reduce transaction costs and the
risk of legal complications.
The 2010 edition of Incoterms is the eighth edition of Incoterms promulgated by the
ICC.40 Effective on January 1, 2011, Incoterms 2010 revises core provisions in the 2000
36. Id. at 893-94.
37. Id. at 897-98.
38. See EC Guidelines, 1[ 6.
39. See, e.g., S.KI. Beer Corp. v. Baltika Brewery, 612 F.3d 705, 707 n.2 (2d Cir. 2010).
40. Int'l Chamber of Commerce, Incoterms 2010: ICC Official Rules for the Interpretation of Trade
Terms (2010) (hereinafter "Incoterms 2010").
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edition of Incoterms. The new edition includes the following key changes from prior
editions:
1. Expansion of Rules to Cover Domestic Trade
Reflecting the increased use of standard terms in both domestic and international com-
merce, Incoterms 2010 formally recognize Incoterms as applicable in both domestic and
international transactions. This recognition was accomplished in Incoterms 2010 by ad-
ding language to several of the rules to the effect that export and import formalities will
only need to be complied with where applicable. Previous Incoterms editions specifically
stated that they were to be used only in global trade and did not mention domestic appli-
cation. Therefore, before Incoterms 2010 became effective, parties in each country typi-
cally used their own trade terms in domestic contracts for the sale of goods.
2. Separation of Rules Applicable to Maritime Transport from Rules Applicable to "Any
Mode" of Transport
In an effort to classify and simplify Incoterms, the ICC assigned the eleven Incoterms
into two distinct classifications: "rules for any mode or modes of transportation" and
"rules for sea and inland waterway transport."41 Under the former classification, In-
coterms Ex Works ("EXW"), Free Carrier ("FCA"), Carriage Paid to ("CPT"), Carriage
and Insurance Paid to ("CIP"), Delivered at Terminal ("DAT"), Delivered at Place
("DAP"), and Delivered Duty Paid ("DDP") may be used "irrespective of the mode of
transport selected and irrespective of whether one or more than one mode of transport is
employed." 42 Specifically, they can be used where no maritime transport is used or where
a ship is used for part of the carriage.43 Under the latter classification, Incoterms Free
Alongside Ship ("FAS"), Free On Board ("FOB"), Cost and Freight ("CFR") and Cost,
Insurance and Freight ("CIF") can be used where the point of delivery and the place
where the goods are carried to are both ports. Thus, the Incoterms FAS, FOB, CFR, and
CIF now belong only in the maritime rules. In the definitions of FOB, CFR, and CIF, the
phrase "ship's rail" has been deleted and the reference now is to delivery of goods "on
board." FAS and FOB do not apply to multimodal sea transport in containers.44
3. Replacement of Incoterms; New Incoterms
Incoterms 2010 reduces the total number of Incoterms from thirteen to eleven by elimi-
nating four old Incoterms and adding two new ones. The 2000 edition used the following
terms: Delivered At Frontier ("DAF"), Delivered Ex Ship ("DES"), Delivered Ex Quay
("DEQ") and Delivered Duty Unpaid ("DDU"). In the 2010 edition, these four terms
have been replaced by: Delivered at Terminal ("DAT") and Delivered at Place ("DAP").
This reduction helps clarify and simplify the terms of delivery. In accordance with the
former Delivery Ex Quay rule, DAT defines "delivery" to mean the goods are at the
41. Id. at 7.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.; see also id. at 715.
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buyer's disposal once unloaded from the arriving means of transport.45 DAP follows the
former DAF, DES, and DDU rules and defines "delivery" such that "the goods are at the
buyer's disposal 'on the arriving means of transport ready for unloading ... at the named
place of destination."'"6
4. Guidance Notes
The ICC also added guidance notes in the latest edition to help practitioners and trad-
ers understand Incoterm rules. In particular, the notes are designed to assist practitioners
in understanding the essence of each Incoterm rule, such as when a rule should be applied,
when risk passes, and how costs are allocated between the seller and the buyer.
5. Electronic Communications
Under Incoterms 2010, electronic means of communications are given the same effect
as paper communication. Articles Al/B1 specifically state that any document referred to
in Al to Al0 [or BI to B10] may be an equivalent electronic record or procedure if agreed
to between the parties or customary.47 The ICC adopted these provisions because it rec-
ognized that parties are increasingly moving towards replacing paper communications
with electronic communications, and it anticipated that this trend would increase during
the next decade before the Incoterms undergo another revision.
6. Carriage and Insurance Information
Incoterms 2010 also more conspicuously place information duties on the seller and the
buyer relating to contracts of carriage and insurance in articles A3/B3. (These provisions
were moved from the generic articles A10/B10 of Incoterms 2000 into current articles A3/
B3). Information relating to carriage and insurance is important so that both parties are
put on notice of the responsibilities of each party. Furthermore, Incoterms CIP and CIF
take into account the Institute Cargo Clauses, by placing an obligation on the seller to
obtain cargo insurance at seller's expense by complying with minimum coverage under
Clause C of the Institute Cargo Clause and additional coverage at buyer's expense under
Clause A or B of the Institute Cargo Clause when required by the buyer.
7. Security-Related Clearances
Due to heightened security concerns with respect to the movement of goods, the ICC
added new security-related rules. Security-related clearances implemented by Incoterms
2010 allocate obligations between the buyer and seller which require verification that the
goods do not pose a threat to life or property for reasons other than their inherent nature.
The purpose of this rule is to permit security checks on goods shipped domestically and
internationally. Among the specific security-related clearances in Incoterms 2010 are
chain-of-custody information, included in articles A2/B2 and A10/B10 of various In-
coterms rules.
45. Id. at 54.
46. Id. at 62.
47. Id. at 8.
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8. Handling Charges
Incoterms 2010 clarify the arrangement of allocating handling and carriage costs under
CPT, CIP, CFR, CIF, DAT, DAP, and DDP. Typically, the seller must make arrange-
ments for the carriage of the goods to the agreed destination, and the freight costs are
normally included in the total selling price. The carriage cost can typically include the
cost of handling the goods within the port or terminal, and the carrier or terminal opera-
tor may charge its costs to the buyer for these services. Hence, the buyer will want to
avoid being double charged by both the seller in the total selling price and by the carrier
or terminal operator in the carrier cost. The Incoterms 2010 rules clarify this arrange-
ment by specifically allocating costs in articles A6/B6 of the Incoterms CPT, CIP, CFR,
CIF, DAT, DAP, and DDP.48
9. Sting Sales
Incoterms FAS, FOB, CFR, and CIF include the obligation to "procure" goods shipped
as an alternative to the obligation to "ship" goods for what are commonly referred to as
"string sales."49 String sales are defined as multiple sales down a chain and are common in
commodity trades as opposed to the sale of manufactured goods. In string sales, a seller in
the middle of the string "procures" the goods, rather than "ships" the goods, because the
goods have already been shipped by the first seller in the string.50 Incoterms 2010 incor-
porate this language in order to clarify the difference between these two scenarios.
B. FAILURE OF AMENDED ARTICLE 2, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
In 2003, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws ("NC-
CUSL"), following approval by the American Law Institute, proposed amendments to the
Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") article on Sales, Article 2. The proposed amend-
ments, among other things, would have eliminated the definitions of shipping terms con-
tained in former sections 2-319 through 2-324. This proposal was justified on the ground
that the Article 2 definitions had become "inconsistent with modern commercial prac-
tices,"5' which rely on the parties either to explicitly set their own private contract rules
on significant shipping related issues (e.g., risk of loss, delivery location, insurance, carrier,
and expenses) or rely on standard definitions used in trade such as those contained in the
Incoterms.
The proposed elimination of shipping terms in Amended Article 2 would have been
consistent with the approach to this issue taken by the United Nations Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods ("CISG"),52 which does not define or pre-
scribe shipping terms.53 While the logic behind the elimination of the shipping terms in
48. Id. at 36-37, 48-49, 56-57, 64-65, 72-73, 100-01, 112-13.
49. Id. at 79, 87, 95, 105.
50. Id.
51. Legislative Note to Amended U.C.C. art. 2, §§ 2-319-24 (repealed).
52. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, opened for signature
Apr. 11, 1980, 19 I.L.M. 668.
53. See, e.g., United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods ("CISG"), art.
32(2) ("If the seller is bound to arrange for carriage of the goods, he must make such contracts as are neces-
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Amended Article 2 was compelling, seven years later, not a single state has adopted
Amended Article 2.s4 It appears that the 2003 amendments will never achieve widespread
acceptance for reasons that have little or nothing to do with the proposed elimination of
former sections 2-319 through 2-324.ss
Nonetheless, with the recent implementation of Incoterms 2010, it would seem to be a
good time for contracting parties in the United States to review their standard practices
with regard to shipping terms. Article 2 definitions of shipping terms are in some ways
inconsistent with the Incoterms definitions and may not comport with the parties' expec-
tations, yet contracting parties in the United States have often displayed a distressing ten-
dency to incorporate Article 2 by reference without careful consideration of the
implications of doing so.
Attorneys in the United States who are engaged in drafting contracts for the sale of
goods would do well to abandon their almost automatic reliance on Article 2 of the UCC
in favor of either Incoterms or non-Incoterms language that clearly describes the pre-
ferred position of the drafter with respect to shipment of goods and allocation of the risk
of loss. The modification of Incoterms to include domestic sale contracts gives parties to
sale contracts within the United States a standardized and convenient alternative to reli-
ance on Article 2 shipping term definitions. It is hoped that contracting parties in juris-
dictions such as the United States will increase their reliance on Incoterms, as opposed to
the default rules contained in the unamended version of Article 2 of the UCC that re-
mains in effect in all fifty states.
M. U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods
("CISG")
OnJuly 8, 2010, the Dominican Republic and Turkey became the 75th and 76th coun-
tries to accede to the CISG.56 Originally ratified by eleven countries in 1988, the twenty-
first century has seen several states sign on, from every geographic region and from vari-
ous stages of economic development. Most of these newcomers are developing countries
in the southern hemisphere and the post-communist countries of Eastern Europe.57
sary for carriage to the place fixed by means of transportation appropriate in the circumstances and according
to the usual terms for such transportation." (emphasis added)).
54. As of late 2010, NCCUSL's website indicates that Amended Article 2 is still under legislative consider-
ation only in Oklahoma. A Few Facts About The Amendments to UCC Articles 2 and 2A, NAT'L CONFERENCE
OF COsM'RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, http://www.nccusl.org/Update/uniformact-factsheets/uniform
acts-fs-ucc22A03.asp (last visited Feb. 1, 2011).
55. For discussion of the reasons why Amended Article 2 failed to gain acceptance, see William H. Hen-
ning, Amended Article 2: What Went Wrong?, 11 DuQ. Bus. L.J. 131 (2009).
56. See Status: 1980 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, U.N. Comm'N
ON INT'L TRADE L., http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral-texts/sale-goods/1980CISG status.htm
(site last visited on Feb. 1, 2011). The CISG will enter into force on July 1, 2011 for the Dominican Repub-
lic, and on August 1, 2011 for Turkey. The accession makes the Dominican Republic the second country in
the Caribbean region to adopt the CISG, after Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, which adopted the treaty
effective October 1, 2001. See CISG, arts. 98-99.
57. See Camilla Baasch Andersen, Reasonable Time in Article 39 (1) of the CISG-Is Article 39(1) Truly a
Uniform Provision?, (Pace University Law Sch., Working Paper, 1998), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/
cisg/biblio/andersen.htnl ("The success of the CISG is not surprising. Preceded by the less successful 1964
ULIS, and ULF, the drafting of the CISG was conducted explicitly on the basis of forming more widely
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The CISG contemplates that uniform rules governing contracts for the international
sale of goods should take into account the differences among social, economic, and legal
systems. Created to foster the development of international trade on the basis of equality
and mutual benefit as an important element in promoting friendly relations among na-
tions, the CISG aims to promote international trade by removing legal barriers in interna-
tional trade and to unify international sales law.58 In this vein, the CISG provides uniform
rules that govern certain aspects of the making and performance of everyday commercial
contracts for the sale of goods.
The genesis of the CISG lies in the two 1964 Hague Conventions sponsored by the
International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT). The
UNIDROIT rules carried little or no weight outside of Western Europe because the rules
were viewed as too Eurocentric and irrelevant to legal cultures outside Western Europe.59
The CISG emerged from the efforts of the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law ("UNCITRAL"), in light of the limited acceptance of the Hague Conventions,
to remedy the perceived wrongs of Eurocentricity and the archaic rules of the lex
mercatoria.
The CISG is divided into four main parts. Part I defines the Conventions' sphere of
application and contains provisions as to interpretations, usages and requirements of con-
tractual form.60 Part II deals with the formation of the contract.61 Part III contains the
main body of rules on sale of goods, 62 and Part IV provides the public international frame-
work.63 The signal mandate of the CISG is contained in its precepts of uniformity guided
by the civil law tradition of good faith in the formation of contracts.
To this end, Article 7(1) of the Convention provides: "In the interpretation of this
Convention, regard is to be had to its international character and to the need to promote
uniformity in its application and the observance of good faith in international trade."64 A
large part of CISG jurisprudence pivots around Article 7 because of its goal of "erasing
disparities in international trade." In the context of developing countries, like those of the
Caribbean, the underpinnings of Article 7 illustrate that the relics of "received legal struc-
tures" will be subsumed to allow for uniformity and good faith in the interpretation of
acceptable conventions ... This combined with the ever-growing need to regulate international trade uni-
formly as the borders of the world become a little less discernible and international trade grows in volume,
has made the Convention extremely popular.").
58. Phanesh Koneru, The International Interpretation of the UN Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods: An Approach Based on General Principles, 6 MiNN. J. GooAL TRADE 105 (1997).
59. See Alejandro M. Garro, Reconciliation of Legal Traditions in the U.N. Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods, 23 IrN'L LAw. 443, 468-69 (1989) ("The so-called "North-South" debate was
characterized by (a) the economic fact that developing countries mainly export raw materials and agricultural
products and import technology and finished goods, (b) the underdeveloped technological condition of their
markets; and (c) their frequently justified mistrust of developed industrial states.").
60. CISG, arts. 1-13.
61. Id. arts. 14-24.
62. Id. arts. 25-88.
63. Id. arts. 89-101.
64. Id. art. 7 ("In the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had to its international character and
to the need to promote uniformity in its application and the observance of good faith in international trade.").
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contract principles. Several cases provide testimony that the mandates of Article 7 have
taken on a life of their own in the adjudication of the CISG.65
Accession to the CISG by the island nations of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and
the Dominican Republic has potential implications for trade in the region as a whole. The
threshold question is to what extent other nations in the region will follow suit.
This question is important because of the push to reform and unify the legal systems of
the members of the British Commonwealth in the Caribbean. Against this backdrop, it is
curious that the other nations of the Commonwealth have largely ignored the incorpora-
tion of the CISG in their discourse on legal reforms. Nevertheless, ratification by these
two countries-one (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines) a common law jurisdiction, the
other (Dominican Republic) a country in the civil law tradition-demonstrates that at the
very least, a hybrid system of domestic and global legal rules on trade is possible, and
should be desirable to the Commonwealth Caribbean nations if legal reform is to have a
chance at success. 66
Undoubtedly, the idea of a uniform law for developing countries is critical to their
economic success given the realities of globalization. 67 The adoption of a uniform sales
law like the CISG might help to heal the wounds of post-colonial countries, and to facili-
tate the growth of the economies of the developing South. 68 What is most desirable is
that the CISG does not presume to champion one legal tradition in favor of another. In
fact, the CISG seeks to erase any distinctions between the civil and commercial character
of the parties.69
The adoption of international treaties like the CISG can operate within the confines of
Caribbean legal traditions in a practical way to move the former colonized nations toward
legal uniformity and equity in the area of international trade.
65. See Case Law on UNCITRAL Texts (CLOU7), U.N. COMss'N ON INT'L TRADE L., http://www.uncitral.
org/uncitral/en/case law.huntl (last visited Feb. 1, 2011). See also Vivian Curran, The Interpretive Challenge to
Uniformity, 15 J. L. & Com. 175 (1995) (book review) (Judges in the civil law countries may come to approxi-
mate their common law counterparts in increasing their reliance on precedent as a source of binding author-
ity due to the widespread availability of the decisions of common law courts applying the CISG, while judges
in common law jurisdictions may come to approximate their civil law counterparts in seeking elucidation of
relevant legal principles in scholarly writing on the CISG.).
66. See generally JOHN HoNNOLD, UNIFoRM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER THE 1980
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION 18 (Harry M. Flechtner ed., 4th ed. 2009) (acknowledging that interna-
tional legislative machinery is difficult to put into motion where most domestic laws have endured for over a
century and recommending that the CISG, which "provides for flexibility," be "read and applied in a manner
that permits it to grow and adapt to novel circumstances and changing times.").
67. See Amy H. Kastely, Unification and Community: A Rhetorical Analysis ofthe United Nations Sales Conven-
tion, 8 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 574, 583-84, n.37 (1988) (quoting sources from the debates on the proposed
CISG that the "removal of . .. legal obstacles" to international trade was of "special importance to the
developing countries, whose economies depended largely on foreign trade").
68. See, e.g., Harry M. Flechtner, The Several Texts of the CISG in Decentralized System: Observations on
Translations, Reservations and Other Challenges to the Unifornity Principle in Article 7(1), 17 J. L. & Com. 187
(1998). See also Azzouni Ahmad, The Adoption of the 1980 Convention on the International Sale of Goods by the
United Kingdom (Pace University Law Sch. Working Paper, 2002), available at http://www.law.pace.edulcisg/
bibliolazzouni.html ("[C]ritics have complained that the CISG is not well formulated and many norms re-
main ambiguous and this will not produce uniformity because it will be subject to different national
interpretations.").
69. CISG, art. 1(3).
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IV. Sweden: Notice of Termination of Distributorship Agreements
In a decision rendered on November 3, 2009, the Swedish Supreme Court held that
there is a general obligation for both parties in a contractual distributorship relationship
to provide the other party with reasonable notice in the event of a termination of the
contract.70
Although commercial agents and commission agents in Europe are subject to wide-
spread legislation, some of it based on EU legislation, "true" distributors are not equally
regulated (the one obvious exception to this general rule being Belgium). 71 As with most
countries in Western Europe, Sweden lacks specific legislation dealing with distributors.
One of the main reasons for this is that trade associations representing suppliers and dis-
tributors agreed on a set of standard terms for exclusive distributors in 1984 which, it was
generally believed, would become standard practice in the trade. 72 As the general terms
contained many provisions similar to the Commercial Agency Act,73 which in its turn was
a result of European law, 74 it was felt that there was no need for specific legislation. It was
reasoned that the similarities between the general terms and the Commercial Agency Act
made analogous application of the provisions of the latter especially appropriate with re-
spect to distributorship agreements. 75 But, this was left to the courts to decide.
Case law regarding distributorship agreements remained relatively scarce. In 1989, the
Swedish Supreme Court ruled in a case involving a contractual relationship which was
deemed to be "more far reaching than an ordinary supply agreement." 76 In the absence of
an agreement between the parties, the court found that there had been no obligation on
the supplier to provide notice to the buyer/distributor before terminating the contract
between the parties. The supplier was entitled to terminate the agreement with immedi-
ate effect.
Then came the case of the arctic bread distributor. In the small community of Gal-
livare, situated some 100 kilometers north of the Arctic Circle in Sweden, two companies
in the bakery business, Malmberg AB and Allbrod Lapland AB, entered into an agreement
regarding the distribution and marketing of Malmberg's products. The agreement, which
was never reduced to writing, also contained obligations on marketing and certain product
development. The distributor, Allbr6d, bought the products from the supplier, Malm-
berg, and sold them in its own name, taking the full financial risk. Although the distribu-
tor was the supplier's only source of distribution in the area, it also marketed other brands
of bakery products. It was a classic example of a "true" distributorship agreement.
70. Nytt Juridiskt Arkiv [NJA] [Supreme Court] 2009-11-03 p. 672 T203-08 (Swed.), available at http://
www.hogstadomstol.se/Domstolar/hogstadomstolen/Avgoranden/2009/2009-11-03_T_203-08_dom.pdf
[hereinafter NJA].
71. See Loi relative la r6siliation unilateral des concessions de vente exclusive i durie ind6terminbe [Law
on the unilateral termination of exclusive distribution agreements of indefinite duration] July 27, 1961 (BeIg.),
available at http://suisse.juridat.be/cgi loi/loiF.pl?cn=1961072703.
72. Standard Agreement for Exclusive Distributorship,EA84, later replaced by FA04. See Garde Wesslau
Advokatbyra, Mandatory Notice Period for Termination of a Distributorship, http://www.intemationallaw
office.com/Newsletters/detail.aspx?g=5cl95cf0-9543-4ae4-al78-f4e2d26b7eea&redir=l (last visited Mar. 30,
2011).
73. LAG OM HANDELSAGENTUR (Svensk farfattningssamling [SFS} 1991:351).
74. Council Directive 86/553/EEC, 1986 O.J. (L***) xxx (EC) [hereinafter Commercial Agents Directive].
75. Statens Offentliga Utredningar [SOU] 1984:85 at 186.
76. NJA 1989 A 7.
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Some seven years passed when, in 2004 and for reasons irrelevant to the question now
at hand, the supplier decided to terminate the agreement with immediate effect. A dispute
arose between the two parties, where the supplier claimed payment for goods delivered
prior to the termination while the distributor on the other hand claimed damages due to
the absence of any period of notice in terminating the distribution agreement.
The district court came to the conclusion that the distributor had failed to prove that
there had been any agreement on a period of notice for termination between the parties.
The court dismissed the possibility that a general obligation of loyalty between two con-
tracting parties could constitute a basis for an implied period of notice. The district court
also ruled out the use by analogy of legislation applicable to, inter alia, commercial agents
or commission agents. Consequently, the district court held, the supplier had committed
no breach of contract for terminating without notice.
The appellate court, however, overturned the district court's decision and found that
the supplier was obliged to give the distributor a reasonable period of notice, in this case
corresponding to three months.77 After about two years in the appellate process, the case
was heard by the Swedish Supreme Court in 2009.
In its November 3, 2009 decision, the Supreme Court began by finding that the rela-
tionship between the parties must be characterized as a distributorship agreement and that
there is no Swedish legislation which directly governs such agreements. Like the court of
first instance and the intermediate appellate court, the Supreme Court also found that it
had not been established by the evidence in the case that there had been any agreement
between the parties regarding notice of termination. The question then remained
whether, under Swedish law, there is a general obligation to give notice under a distribu-
torship contract.
The high court sought guidance from legislation applicable to comparable contract re-
lationships as well as from case law. But the Supreme Court also expressly took into
consideration the fact that distributorship contracts often are of an international nature.
Drawing on sources as diverse as section 2-309 of the Uniform Commercial Code, Euro-
pean national legislation, and the Draft Common Frame of Reference ("DCFR"),78 the
Supreme Court held that, in the absence of an agreement between the parties to the con-
trary, a party to a distributorship agreement who wished to terminate the contract had an
obligation to give reasonable notice to the other party. This obligation applies regardless
of whether it is the supplier or the distributor who is the terminating party.
What then constitutes a "reasonable period of notice?" The Supreme Court set down
four principal, but not exhaustive, considerations drawn from the DCFR: (i) the intended
term of the contractual relationship; (ii) investments made by the other party, to the ex-
tent that such investments were reasonable given the contractual relationship; (iii) the
time it takes for the other party to find an alternative commercial solution to the situation;
and (iv) trade custom. 7 9 But, unlike the DCFR,so the Supreme Court rejected the notion
of a minimum period of notice in favor of a case-by-case inquiry.
77. NJA 2009-11-03 at p. 672.
78. The DCFR is a set of model rules drafted by two working groups consisting of academics representing
all the member states of the EU, the Study Group on a European Civil Code, and the Research Group on EC
Private Law (Acquis Group). See LAw-NET.EU, http://www.law-net.eu (site last visited Feb. 1, 2011).
79. NJA 2009-11-03 at pp. 672, 693-94.
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The Supreme Court's analysis of the importance of territorial exclusivity of the distrib-
utor is notable: the Court observed that in the case of a termination by the supplier, it is
less important that a distributor had exclusivity to sell the products in a specific territory
than that the distributor was prevented from selling products other than those of the
supplier. The absence of an agreed right to compensation for goodwill created by the
distributor during the contract term might also result in a longer period of notice being
deemed reasonable.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court found that a notice period of three months would have
been reasonable in this particular case.8 1 This aspect of the Court's ruling was indeed
case-specific, and it would be unwise to conclude that a three-month notice period in a
long-term distributorship agreement may now be considered the norm. The Swedish Su-
preme Court seems to be taking international contract law into greater consideration
when applying Swedish law, even when, as in this case, the contract was between two
Swedish companies and concerned products distributed in Sweden.
80. The DCFR presumes notice reasonable with respect to non-fixed term contracts of commercial agency,
franchising, and retailing if at least one month's notice is given for each year the contract was in force, up to a
maximum of 36 months. See DCFR IV.E.-2:302: Contract for an indefinite period; NJA 2009-11-03 at pp.
672, 694.
81. NJA 2009-11-03 at pp. 672, 694.
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